Nos hemos pasado la campaña electoral escuchando a todos los candidatos del PSOE repitiendo como si de un mantra se tratara que el PP no ha explicado en ningún momento cuál va a ser su política económica ni las acciones que va a emprender para dar la vuelta a la terrible situación en la que se encuentra España en la actualidad. Y del mismo modo, nos hemos pasado la campaña electoral oyendo a los del PP como respondian diciendo que sí, que el programa existe y que está contenido en un documento (el Programa Electoral) de centenares de páginas y que nadie ha leido ni leerá jamas porque está lleno de vaguedades y escrito en un lenguaje tan calculadamente ambiguo que parece decir una cosa y lo contrario a la vez.

Pero ete aquí que los colegas de Credit Suisse se descuelgan el pasado 17 de noviembre con un documento de 6 folios elaborado por su equipo de analistas y distribuido a su selecta lista de clientes institucionales. El título no deja de ser esclarecedor: “Spain: And another one bites the dust”. Sin entrar en el detalle del documento en aras de la brevedad des esta nota uno no puede dejar de maravillarse por lo escueto, claro y transparente que resulta el análisis. Se nota que está escrito por unos tipos listos y con estudios que saben que sus clientes no tienen tiempo para perderse en literatura. En apenas tres líneas, los chicos de Credit Suisse dejan claro cuál va a ser la política económica del PP a partir del 21 de noviembre:

“At the core of the PP’s programme is fiscal stability, reforms of the labour market and financial sector, and increasing the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. But in order not to alienate voters the programme has eluded any specifics on what this will cost and how Spain will meet deficit reduction targets.”

(Credit Suisse, 17/11/2011 – Economics Research – European Economics: “Spain: And another one bites the dust”)

Es decir:

1) “Fiscal stability”: Estabilidad fiscal, que equivale a subida de impuestos en el corto plazo y a esperar que una hipotética mejora en el PIB se refleje una eventual reducción del desempleo. Como resulta que España no crea empleo neto hasta que no crece al 2,5% y en este momento lo hacemos a un magro 0,1% (es decir, si descontamos el “maquillaje” estamos en recesión) lo único cierto es que va a haber subida de impuestos más pronto que tarde. Hasta aquí por la parte de los ingresos. En lo que se refirere a los gastos e inversiones, no hay más que fijarse en lo que lleva haciendo la Generalitat de Catalunya desde que llegó CiU al poder hace un año. Sobran comentarios.

2) “Reforms of the labour market”: Reformas del mercado laboral. Esta es fácil. Abaratar el despido con la esperanza de que al resultar más barato despedir los empresarios se animen a contratar más aunque sea con mayor precariedad. Ante la disyuntiva de tener un mercado laboral “seguro” para unos pocos que trabajan o un mercado laboral “inseguro” para que más ciudadanos puedan trabajar, se optará por lo segundo. Esta por ver si esa estrategia conduce a una mayor tasa de empleo pero la realidad es que no hay muchas alternativas. Malos tiempos para el sindicalismo de pancarta. O buenos, según se mire: van a poder pasarse una buena temporada manifestándose y convocando huelgas generales.

3) “Reforms of the financial sector”: Esta también es fácil. Se creará el famoso “banco malo” y se absorberán total o parcialmente las pérdidas que todavía están ocultas en el balance de las Entidades Financieras. Por el camino quedarán unos cuantos “cadáveres” financieros y, con el argumento de que el sector financiero necesita sanearse para volver a dar crédito y que sin la ayuda del Estado es imposible se cambiarán ladrillos en quiebra por deuda pública. Como siempre, habrá banqueros ganadores y banqueros perdedores. Muy significativo que Rodrigo Rato estuviera anoche en primer tiempo de saludo y felicitando al ganador en la planta noble de la sede del PP.

4) “Increasing the competitiveness of the Spanish economy”. Lo de incrementar la competitividad de la economía española ya son palabras mayores. Eliminado el mecanismo tradicional de incremento de competitividad, es decir la devaluación de la moneda, únicamente queda la vía del incremento de la productividad lo que acaba significando que hay que producir (y vender) más a un coste más bajo. Otro impacto directo sobre los costes laborales y de producción.

Bien, pues estos son los ejes del programa económico del próximo Gobierno de España según nos cuenta Credit Suisse. Parece que los pesos pesados del área económica del PP han preferido irse a Londres y contárselo a los analistas internacionales en inglés antes que explicarlo aquí en castellano. Probablemente en ello influye que Rajoy ha tenido bien presente lo que le sucedió a David Cameron en las recientes elecciones inglesas, quién de puro explícito contando en campaña lo duro que iba a ser el ajuste se quedó sin mayoría absoluta.

Pero, claro, como a una pregunta directa de un analista en Londres no se puede responder con evasivas, es evidente que a los futuros rectores de la economía nacional no les quedó otra que confesar el por que no dicen en castellano lo mismo que dicen en inglés: “But in order not to alienate voters the programme has eluded any specifics on what this will cost and how Spain will meet deficit reduction targets”. Más claro, agua.

El pasado viernes se publicaron los esperadísimos test de stress de la banca europea correspondientes a 2011. Resultado para las entidades españolas: cinco suspensos sobre veinticinco grupos nacionales analizados, gran fortaleza de BBVA, Santander y CaixaBank, raquítico resultado de Bankia y Banca Cívica y, no menos destacable, un majestuoso primer lugar europeo por solvencia atribuido a Banca March con un 23,5% de ratio de capital de primera calidad (Core Tier 1). Los suspenidos son los “sospechosos habituales”: CAM, un zombie en espera de intervención; Unnim, pendiente de que alguien la compre en breve a un precio digno; CatalunyaCaixa, un paciente que lleva 3 años en la UVI con su deuda calificada como bonos-basura; y Pastor, lacerante ejemplo de las dificultades de la banca mediana española. Sorprende, sin embargo, la inclusión del grupo CAI-Círculo-Badajoz, especialmente porque ha sido el único proceso de integración de cajas que no ha requerido ayudas del FROB. A modo de recordatorio, los suspendidos en 2010, con un test en teoría más benévolo, fueron: Caja España-Duero, Banca Cívica, Unnim, CatalunyaCaixa y Cajasur (ya intervenida). Como nota colateral, señalar que el Gobernador del Banco de España se ha apresurado a indicar que, si se contabilizan las provisiones genéricas y los bonos convertibles, todas las entidades financieras españolas superan el test de stress (sic.) aunque, en sentido contrario, si no se contabilizaran las ayudas comprometidas por el FROB, el suspenso hubiera alcanzado a un total de nueve entidades y hubiera dejado en el margen del 5%-6% a otras seis. Especialmente curioso resulta el criterio utilizado para contabilizar el Core Tier 1 de Bankia, Banca Cívica y BMN: se les ha permitido incluir como fondos propios de máxima calidad un total de 7.006 millones de euros que esperan obtener en sus respectivas salidas a Bolsa o, si ello no es posible, su aportación equivalente por parte del FROB. Sorprendente criterio de prudencia contable el aplicado a estas entidades, que les permite apuntarse como capital unos fondos que ni tienen al tiempo del análisis ni tienen plenamente garantizados en el futuro.

Explicado en palabras coloquiales, el famoso test de stress es como una especie de análisis de sensibilidad en el que se mide la resistencia del denominado Core Tier 1 (es decir, Capital + Reservas) de una Entidad Financiera ante diversos escenarios adversos en las variables del mercado para los meses inmediatamente siguientes. El “escenario adverso” que se utiliza para valorar el resultado del análisis en España es, a grandes rasgos, el siguiente: 1) Reducción del PIB en un 4,6% para 2012; 2) Caida del 21,9% adicional del precio de la vivienda entre 2011 y 2012 y del 46,7% en el precio del suelo; y 3) Traslación directa del incremento del diferencial soberano al coste de financiación mayorista (en España llegó a +370 bp en Julio 2011). El ratio mínimo de Core Tier 1 que se exige para superar el test en el peor escenario posible es del 5%. Por debajo de ese ratio se suspende, si se está entre el 5% y el 6% se recibe un warning (aviso) y si se está por encima del 6% se entiende que se tiene plena solvencia.

Dicho lo anterior, lo verdaderamente cierto es que la única opinión realmente válida acerca de la solvencia de una Entidad Financiera es la del analista de turno, entre otros, de Goldman Sachs, Apollo Investments, Och-Ziff, Carval Investors, los gestores de fondos soberanos chinos y de Oriente Medio, y algún que otro fondo de pensiones occidental… Porque son ellos y nadie más que ellos los que dan las órdenes de compra para las emisiones de deuda/equity de las Entidades Financieras europeas. Y lo cierto es que ninguno de ellos (podriamos decir que el “consenso de los mercados” para incluirlos a todos) se cree ni una línea de los resultados de los test en Europa y, especialmente, en España. La demostración más simple y palpable de dicha falta de confianza es que ninguna Entidad Financiera española, con la excepción puntual de Banco Santander, BBVA y CaixaBank, es capaz de obtener financiación mayorista sin el aval del Estado y el apoyo del BCE. Tal y como está la situación en estos momentos, nadie se cree nada más allá de los análisis (confidenciales por definición) de sus propios servicios de estudios.

La realidad es que los resultados de este test de stress, igual que todos los anteriores, ha sido “cocinado” entre los bancos centrales con el consentimiento de la European Banking Association (EBA) y no contribuyen a calmar los mercados ni a transmitir confianza a los inversores. Lo cierto es que únicamente sirven para ganar un cierto tiempo hasta que los mercados, nerviosos como hacía décadas que no estaban, vuelvan a exigir una nueva señal regulatoria del nivel teórico de solvencia de las Entidades Financieras europeas. Las razones principales para ello son:

1) La falta de criterios de valoración homogéneos y consensuados entre todos los Estados participantes en el test.Como bien indica Miquel Roig en su certero análisis publicado por Expansión, los alemanes están molestos por la no inclusión de los “silent capital” (híbridos de acciones/deuda) de sus politizados bancos regionales y España clama al cielo por la no inclusión de las provisiones genéricas ni de los bonos convertibles (aunque no dice nada sobre las ayudas, presentes y futuras, del FROB).

2) Falta de verdadera capacidad coercitiva para imponer las acciones necesarias para corregir los desequilibrios detectados. Al no haber criterios homogéneos y tampoco disponer de un sistema realmente eficiente de supervisión bancaria a nivel pan-europeo, la responsabilidad de exigir la recapitalización de un banco suspendido queda en manos de los reguladores nacionales. Mientras el Comisario Europeo de Asuntos Económicos y Monetarios pedía medidas de recapitalización, el Banco de España ya se ha apresurado a manifestar, por boca del Gobernador, que aquí no pasa nada. Que nosotros sí contabilizamos las provisiones genéricas y los bonos convertibles y por, tanto, a efectos nacionales todas las entidades españolas superan el test de stress y no hay que tomar medidas adicionales de mejora de solvencia. ¿Pero no habíamos quedado que la CAM está a punto de ser intervenida?, ¿Y que la deuda de CatalunyaCaixa está calificada como Speculative Grade, es decir, deuda solo comprable por los gestores de distressed debt más agresivos?. No parece que la opinión del regulador sea muy consistente con la opinión de quienes, al fin y al cabo, compran la deuda de las entidades en los mercados internacionales.

3) La exclusión del riesgo de impago (default) de la deuda soberana. Se trata, sin duda, del más sangrante de los déficits del test. El conjunto de bancos somentidos a las pruebas acumulan un total de 194.100 millones de euros de los paises rescatados: Irlanda (52.700), Portugal (43.200) y Grecia (98.200). Si añadimos a la lista a España, nos encontramos que, únicamente las entidades españolas, acumulan la friolera de 222.735 millones adicionales. La primera y más consensuada reacción de los analistas es que la no inclusión del riesgo de impago de los países rescatados desvirtúa el resultado del test. Que Grecia va a caer en default es algo que nadie duda a estas alturas, únicamente se discute el tamaño de la quita (o el haircut, como decimos ahora utilizando la última palabra de moda en finanzas). Si la quita es del 30%, el impacto es de 32.000 millones de euros en las cuentas de los 91 bancos sometidos al test. Nada inasumible, desde luego, pero que modificaría sustancialmente los resultados del test. Cosa muy distinta sería si el test contemplara una quita semejante de la deuda de España o, no digamos, de la mismísima Italia.

En definitiva, como muy bien apuntaba un analista el mismo día de publicación de los resultados del test, nada nuevo bajo el sol. Las entidades que viven de la respiración asistida del FROB y la benevolencia del BdE siguen a lo suyo y las que tienen planes de salir a Bolsa están más preocupadas por lo que piensan en la City o Wall Street que en Bruselas. Los que pueden acabar pagando la cena de estos resultados serán, sin duda, los bancos medianos españoles que, por su excesiva exposición a la economía nacional y al inmobiliario unido al escaso margen con el que han aprobado, pueden recibir en las próximas semanas severos castigos en su cotización. En todo caso, lo realmente preocupante a corto plazo no son los resultados de este test de stress sino que la prima de riesgo de la deuda sobreana del Reino de España cerró el viernes en unos estratosféricos 337 bp. Si no hay corrección a corto plazo, los problemas de nuestras entidades financieras van a parecer un juego de niños comparado con la que se nos vendrá encima.

Hace unos días tuve un “déjà vu”. Me explicaré. Un déjà vu es ese mecanismo mental por el cual uno tiene la sensación de haber vivido con anterioridad algún suceso del presente. Hace algunos años, Denzel Washington protagonizó una excelente película de intriga que llevaba por título precisamente “Déjà Vu” y en la genial “Matrix” podemos ver algunas escenas brillantes en las que queda muy claro el concepto. Parece que las causas médico/psicológicas del fenómeno no están nada claras y, según leo en Wikipedia, hasta el 96% de la población manifiesta haber tenido al menos una experiencia déjà vu a lo largo de su vida.

Pues resulta que tuve una de esas experiencias sensoriales hace cosa de un par de semanas. El suceso ocurrió en el Antepalco del Camp Nou durante el intermedio del partido de Champions League entre el Barça y el Panathinaikos. Andaba yo deambulando por allí, con un refresco en la mano, saludando a conocidos y no tan conocidos mientras todos hacíamos tiempo hasta que nos llamaran de vuelta a nuestras butacas cuando, de repente y sin previo aviso, simplemente sucedió. En un momento determinado y como surgidos de la nada, se me aparecieron dos personajes que, cruzando de un extremo a otro la sala, venían directamente hacia mí, sonrientes y llamando mi atención en voz alta. Les vi venir y confieso que tardé un par de segundos en reaccionar. Ocurre que uno se maneja de ordinario en distintos entornos (como todo el mundo, por otra parte) y en cada uno de ellos espera encontrarse con una tipología específica de personajes. Y, si bien es cierto que en el Antepalco del Camp Nou abunda una fauna diversa y en ocasiones bien curiosa, debo reconocer que a aquella pareja no hubiera esperado nunca encontrármelos en la zona reservada de ningún estadio de fútbol. Así que, disculpándome, me separé del corrillo en que encontraba y me dispuse a afrontar, entre sorprendido e intrigado, a mis dos nuevos/viejos conocidos.

Uno de ellos, al que yo había tratado más en el pasado ya que había sido cliente del área legal de Mediterranean Capital, era un ex empleado de banca que había sido despedido unos años atrás por alguna de esas razones inconfesables que los bancos siempre ocultan y los abogados no podemos contar por aquello del secreto profesional. Posteriormente se había ganado la vida intermediando, desde una conocida franquicia financiera hoy en quiebra, la concesión de hipotecas durante los años de la burbuja inmobiliaria y el crédito fácil y lo último que sabía de él es que su matrimonio había acabado de mala manera y que andaba con algunos problemas en el Juzgado de Instrucción a causa de ello. El otro también era conocido mío pero por razones bien distintas y simples: era el electricista que se ocupa del mantenimiento y los arreglos de mi casa en la playa.

Así que, después de los abrazos y saludos de rigor, la pregunta obligada: “Cuanto tiempo sin vernos. ¿Cómo va todo?”. Y ahí empezó mi experiencia paramnésica. No había yo acabado de formular la pregunta que los dos al unísono empezaron a contarme, con el brillo de la codicia en los ojos, su actual y maravilloso proyecto empresarial. El tema era que el verano anterior habían realizado un viaje al norte de Brasil y que una vez allí descubrieron hipnotizados (de hecho, seguían hipnotizados) las enormes posibilidades del mercado inmobiliario en el país carioca. Empezaron a vomitar datos, mayoritariamente inconexos, acerca de la enorme cantidad de promociones iniciadas, del crecimiento esperado de la población en el país, de lo bien que iba todo con las expectativas del próximo Mundial de Fútbol y de los Juegos Olímpicos, etc… Así que habían decidido convertirse en promotores inmobiliarios en Brasil y, como iban escasos de caja, ya estaban negociando dos permutas de solares por futura construcción en una ciudad cuyo nombre no recuerdo pero que parece que iba a ser la próxima Rio de Janeiro. Vale decir, por otra parte, que  su experiencia como promotores inmobiliarios en España era nula y su conocimiento del entorno legal y financiero del país en el que pretendían invertir era igualmente inexistente. Además, su conocimiento de la idiosincrasia de los subcontratistas brasileños se limitaba a un par de contactos con algunos  electricistas de la zona. Pero todo eso daba igual. Habían detectado la oportunidad, tenían claro que iban a forrarse y se iban a Brasil a invertir el poco dinero que tenían. Así de claro y así de sencillo. A medida que la conversación (monólogo, más bien) avanzaba, se iban apareciendo en mi mente uno tras otro los Factores Clave de Fracaso que Fernando Trías de Bes enumera en su espléndido “El Libro Negro del Emprendedor”[1] así que traté de disuadirles explicándoles que nosotros sí teníamos experiencia en el mercado de Brasil, que yo mismo he vivido y trabajado durante varios años en Sao Paulo, que existe un riesgo-país y de divisa importante, que el mercado inmobiliario da claros signos de recalentamiento, que el riesgo operativo debe ser correctamente evaluado, etc… Todo inútil. De hecho, incluso me llegaron a mirar contrariados, como si estuviera intentando quitarles la idea de la cabeza para aprovecharla yo mismo o algo así. En consecuencia, y ayudado por el sonido del timbre que anuncia el inicio de la segunda parte, desistí de continuar por esa vía y me despedí amablemente de los dos futuros reyes del mercado inmobiliario brasileño quienes se quedaron en el Antepalco comentando entre ellos los detalles de su proyecto en ciernes.

Lo cierto es que no le hubiera dado más importancia al asunto de no ser por algo tan trivial como que el F.C. Barcelona atacaba en la segunda parte en la portería contraria a la que están nuestras butacas y como Pep Guardiola no nos dejaba ver bien el partido (nuestras localidades están tan bajas en la tribuna que cuando Pep se levanta, mi hija no ve las jugadas) volví a  reflexionar sobre la charla que acababa de mantener: ¿Dónde había escuchado yo antes esa misma conversación?, ¿Había sido en los 90, cuando nuestros informáticos en Bertelsmann ganaban más dinero invirtiendo en las puntocom que trabajando en nuestros proyectos para después arruinarse en el crack del 2000?, ¿O había sido en el 2006, cuando nuestros ingenieros en Italcementi pedían la cuenta para comprar parcelas y construir en la insensata seguridad de que era normal que los pisos en Fuenlabrada se pagaran a 6.000 euros el metro cuadrado?…

No, no era ese el déjà vu que me rondaba por la cabeza. Lo que me martilleaba desde lo más profundo de mi código de alertas de inversión era la famosa anécdota de John D. Rockefeller, esa que cuenta como, unos días antes del crack de octubre de 1929, el famoso magnate petrolero estaba limpiándose las botas mientras leía el periódico y de repente el limpiabotas le interrumpió en su lectura explicándole que había invertido todos sus ahorros en Bolsa y que sin duda iba a ganar tanto dinero que no necesitaría volver a limpiar botas nunca más en su vida. Rockefeller calló, acabó de limpiarse las botas y de leer la prensa, subió de vuelta a su oficina y deshizo inmediatamente todas sus posiciones en renta variable. Unos días más tarde la Bolsa de Nueva York estallaba, y Rockefeller pasó los meses siguientes enriqueciéndose aún más comprando valores a lo que técnicamente denominamos “bargaining prices”, que no es otra cosa que comprar acciones a precios muy inferiores a su valor intrínseco. La moraleja del asunto es que cuando un mercado se ha recalentado tanto para que los limpiabotas, informáticos, electricistas, ex empleados de banca, etc se vean capaces de operar en el convencimiento de que se van a hacer ricos, es el momento de salir disparado hacia otras oportunidades porque ese está a punto de estallar y la curva riesgo-rendimiento se ha puesto con demasiada pendiente.

La mañana siguiente después de desayunar, leer el clipping de prensa y repasar los datos diarios de nuestras posiciones de inversión, levanté el teléfono e hice varias llamadas a nuestros clientes con inversiones en Brasil. Las conversaciones fueron cortas:

-      “Chicos, creo que ha llegado el momento de pensar en deshacer nuestras posiciones inmobiliarias en Brasil… Que el último real lo gane otro. Nosotros nos salimos ya.”

-      “Ok. Adelante. Hagámoslo ordenadamente.”

Y en eso estamos.


[1] “El Libro Negro del Emprendedor”, Fernando Trías de Bes; Ediciones Urano, 2007.

A parable about how one nation came to financial ruin

By Charles Munger
© Slate.com

In the early 1700s, Europeans discovered in the Pacific Ocean a large, unpopulated island with a temperate climate, rich in all nature’s bounty except coal, oil, and natural gas. Reflecting its lack of civilization, they named this island “Basicland.”

The Europeans rapidly repopulated Basicland, creating a new nation. They installed a system of government like that of the early United States. There was much encouragement of trade, and no internal tariff or other impediment to such trade. Property rights were greatly respected and strongly enforced. The banking system was simple. It adapted to a national ethos that sought to provide a sound currency, efficient trade, and ample loans for credit-worthy businesses while strongly discouraging loans to the incompetent or for ordinary daily purchases.

Moreover, almost no debt was used to purchase or carry securities or other investments, including real estate and tangible personal property. The one exception was the widespread presence of secured, high-down-payment, fully amortizing, fixed-rate loans on sound houses, other real estate, vehicles, and appliances, to be used by industrious persons who lived within their means. Speculation in Basicland’s security and commodity markets was always rigorously discouraged and remained small. There was no trading in options on securities or in derivatives other than “plain vanilla” commodity contracts cleared through responsible exchanges under laws that greatly limited use of financial leverage.

In its first 150 years, the government of Basicland spent no more than 7 percent of its gross domestic product in providing its citizens with essential services such as fire protection, water, sewage and garbage removal, some education, defense forces, courts, and immigration control. A strong family-oriented culture emphasizing duty to relatives, plus considerable private charity, provided the only social safety net.

The tax system was also simple. In the early years, governmental revenues came almost entirely from import duties, and taxes received matched government expenditures. There was never much debt outstanding in the form of government bonds.

As Adam Smith would have expected, GDP per person grew steadily. Indeed, in the modern area it grew in real terms at 3 percent per year, decade after decade, until Basicland led the world in GDP per person. As this happened, taxes on sales, income, property, and payrolls were introduced. Eventually total taxes, matched by total government expenditures, amounted to 35 percent of GDP. The revenue from increased taxes was spent on more government-run education and a substantial government-run social safety net, including medical care and pensions.

A regular increase in such tax-financed government spending, under systems hard to “game” by the unworthy, was considered a moral imperative—a sort of egality-promoting national dividend—so long as growth of such spending was kept well below the growth rate of the country’s GDP per person.

Basicland also sought to avoid trouble through a policy that kept imports and exports in near balance, with each amounting to about 25 percent of GDP. Some citizens were initially nervous because 60 percent of imports consisted of absolutely essential coal and oil. But, as the years rolled by with no terrible consequences from this dependency, such worry melted away.

Basicland was exceptionally creditworthy, with no significant deficit ever allowed. And the present value of large “off-book” promises to provide future medical care and pensions appeared unlikely to cause problems, given Basicland’s steady 3 percent growth in GDP per person and restraint in making unfunded promises. Basicland seemed to have a system that would long assure its felicity and long induce other nations to follow its example—thus improving the welfare of all humanity.

But even a country as cautious, sound, and generous as Basicland could come to ruin if it failed to address the dangers that can be caused by the ordinary accidents of life. These dangers were significant by 2012, when the extreme prosperity of Basicland had created a peculiar outcome: As their affluence and leisure time grew, Basicland’s citizens more and more whiled away their time in the excitement of casino gambling. Most casino revenue now came from bets on security prices under a system used in the 1920s in the United States and called “the bucket shop system.”

The winnings of the casinos eventually amounted to 25 percent of Basicland’s GDP, while 22 percent of all employee earnings in Basicland were paid to persons employed by the casinos (many of whom were engineers needed elsewhere). So much time was spent at casinos that it amounted to an average of five hours per day for every citizen of Basicland, including newborn babies and the comatose elderly. Many of the gamblers were highly talented engineers attracted partly by casino poker but mostly by bets available in the bucket shop systems, with the bets now called “financial derivatives.”

Many people, particularly foreigners with savings to invest, regarded this situation as disgraceful. After all, they reasoned, it was just common sense for lenders to avoid gambling addicts. As a result, almost all foreigners avoided holding Basicland’s currency or owning its bonds. They feared big trouble if the gambling-addicted citizens of Basicland were suddenly faced with hardship.

And then came the twin shocks. Hydrocarbon prices rose to new highs. And in Basicland’s export markets there was a dramatic increase in low-cost competition from developing countries. It was soon obvious that the same exports that had formerly amounted to 25 percent of Basicland’s GDP would now only amount to 10 percent. Meanwhile, hydrocarbon imports would amount to 30 percent of GDP, instead of 15 percent. Suddenly Basicland had to come up with 30 percent of its GDP every year, in foreign currency, to pay its creditors.

How was Basicland to adjust to this brutal new reality? This problem so stumped Basicland’s politicians that they asked for advice from Benfranklin Leekwanyou Vokker, an old man who was considered so virtuous and wise that he was often called the “Good Father.” Such consultations were rare. Politicians usually ignored the Good Father because he made no campaign contributions.

Among the suggestions of the Good Father were the following. First, he suggested that Basicland change its laws. It should strongly discourage casino gambling, partly through a complete ban on the trading in financial derivatives, and it should encourage former casino employees—and former casino patrons—to produce and sell items that foreigners were willing to buy. Second, as this change was sure to be painful, he suggested that Basicland’s citizens cheerfully embrace their fate. After all, he observed, a man diagnosed with lung cancer is willing to quit smoking and undergo surgery because it is likely to prolong his life.

The views of the Good Father drew some approval, mostly from people who admired the fiscal virtue of the Romans during the Punic Wars. But others, including many of Basicland’s prominent economists, had strong objections. These economists had intense faith that any outcome at all in a free market—even wild growth in casino gambling—is constructive. Indeed, these economists were so committed to their basic faith that they looked forward to the day when Basicland would expand real securities trading, as a percentage of securities outstanding, by a factor of 100, so that it could match the speculation level present in the United States just before onslaught of the Great Recession that began in 2008.

The strong faith of these Basicland economists in the beneficence of hypergambling in both securities and financial derivatives stemmed from their utter rejection of the ideas of the great and long-dead economist who had known the most about hyperspeculation, John Maynard Keynes. Keynes had famously said, “When the capital development of a country is the byproduct of the operations of a casino, the job is likely to be ill done.” It was easy for these economists to dismiss such a sentence because securities had been so long associated with respectable wealth, and financial derivatives seemed so similar to securities.

Basicland’s investment and commercial bankers were hostile to change. Like the objecting economists, the bankers wanted change exactly opposite to change wanted by the Good Father. Such bankers provided constructive services to Basicland. But they had only moderate earnings, which they deeply resented because Basicland’s casinos—which provided no such constructive services—reported immoderate earnings from their bucket-shop systems. Moreover, foreign investment bankers had also reported immoderate earnings after building their own bucket-shop systems—and carefully obscuring this fact with ingenious twaddle, including claims that rational risk-management systems were in place, supervised by perfect regulators. Naturally, the ambitious Basicland bankers desired to prosper like the foreign bankers. And so they came to believe that the Good Father lacked any understanding of important and eternal causes of human progress that the bankers were trying to serve by creating more bucket shops in Basicland.

Of course, the most effective political opposition to change came from the gambling casinos themselves. This was not surprising, as at least one casino was located in each legislative district. The casinos resented being compared with cancer when they saw themselves as part of a long-established industry that provided harmless pleasure while improving the thinking skills of its customers.

As it worked out, the politicians ignored the Good Father one more time, and the Basicland banks were allowed to open bucket shops and to finance the purchase and carry of real securities with extreme financial leverage. A couple of economic messes followed, during which every constituency tried to avoid hardship by deflecting it to others. Much counterproductive governmental action was taken, and the country’s credit was reduced to tatters. Basicland is now under new management, using a new governmental system. It also has a new nickname: Sorrowland.

La escena tiene lugar el pasado domingo, 11 de julio de 2010, a eso de las 12 del mediodía, en un yate fondeado en la Bahía de Sant Pol, frente a S’Agaró. Hace un calor de infarto pero, cosa curiosa, en ninguno de los muchos barcos que han echado el ancla en esa hermosa cala de la Costa Brava parece que la gente se esté agobiando por las temperaturas. Siempre me ha parecido sorprendente que, a igual temperatura, en la playa te achicharres y en un barco hasta tengas sensación de frescor.

De repente, un bote auxiliar se separa de un enorme barco azul y se acerca a un yate blanco algo más pequeño que se encuentra justo al lado contrario de la bahía. Allí recoge a una persona, que curiosamente, no va en bañador, sino vestido con pantalón corto azul y polo blanco de marca. El bote vuelve al megayate y el invitado salta a cubierta, saluda sin detenerse a las dos preciosas chicas que toman el sol en la plataforma de popa, y se dirige al flybridge para reunirse y compartir un aperitivo con el armador

- “¡Buenos días, abogado!”, suelta el propietario del barco, padre de las dos criaturas que se tuestan al sol tres pisos más abajo y cliente del que acaba de llegar.

- “¡Buenos días, Doménico!”, responde el del pantalón azul y polo blanco, contrariado para sus adentros porque lo que a él le apetece de verdad es pasar la mañana en su propio barco, con su mujer y sus hijos.

- “¿Estuviste ayer en la manifestación?“, pregunta el italiano, industrial y financiero como solamente los lombardos de cuna saben serlo, al tiempo que pide dos cervezas frías a la camarera que, impecablemente vestida de blanco, espera atenta a una prudente distancia.

- “Sí, claro. Allí estuve. Cuidando de nuestras inversiones. Ya sabes cómo va esto”. En ese momento, el abogado ya es consciente de que le esperan dos horas de reflexión estratégica acerca de la situación política y las alternativas de inversión en España. Sabe que existe preocupación entre sus clientes por la deriva independentista que se está adueñando de la clase política catalana y ya ha tenido que explicar la misma historia muchas veces durante el pasado invierno. Con mucha suerte, estará de vuelta en su barco a las tres de la tarde y, por supuesto, habrá tenido que compartir mesa y mantel con su socio y cliente.

- “¿Cómo está el ambiente en Barcelona?”, interpela el de Milán, al tiempo que levanta su copa helada para brindar con su abogado, socio y a ratos amigo español.

- “De transición.”, empieza a contar el otro, “Estamos en los estertores del tripartito. Habrá elecciones en Noviembre y ganará CiU, Esquerra se hundirá víctima de su propia inmadurez y de los votos que le arrancarán Carretero, Laporta y compañía. El PSC aguantará el tipo a la baja e Iniciativa se mantendrá en la marginalidad. El PP seguirá sin existir y Ciutadans es más folclore que otra cosa. Los catalanes están cansados de tripartito. La única duda es si CiU ganará con suficiente soltura. Nos preocupa que la Comisión de Investigación del Palau de la Música saque más mierda sobre Convergencia. Si consiguen tapar el agujero de las comisiones que cobraron de Millet & Cía,. pueden llegar a la mayoría absoluta. Y a eso se agarran como un clavo ardiendo todos los demás. Todos, desde Montilla a Puigcercós, pasando por quienquiera que sea el que mande en Iniciativa, sueñan con que salga algún documento que demuestre lo que todos sabemos, que Convergencia metió la mano en la caja. Creen que solo de ese modo podrán reeditar el tripartito. Este es el cuadro”. Llegados a este punto, el abogado calla porque sabe que el otro seguirá preguntando y no quiere quemar toda su pólvora en el primer envite.

- “¿Y qué dicen las ‘fuerzas vivas del país’?, dispara el milanés con evidente sorna, “¿Qué dicen mis amigos de La Caixa, nuestro espléndido presidente del Círculo de Economía y nuestro gran amigo y ex socio editor?”.

El abogado se lleva la cerveza a los labios, mira a lo lejos hacia la abarrotada playa y, después de unos segundos de reflexión, continúa explicando:

- “Pues ya sabes. Como siempre. Fainé está imperial. De hecho, le da igual quién gane las elecciones. Lo único que le preocupa es que las Administraciones no le pidan más dinero del previsto y que eso no le afecte al rating de sus emisiones de deuda. Además, el Gobierno le ha pedido que se ponga el mono de trabajo y se ocupe de que ninguna Caja de Ahorros se ponga tonta ahora que las van a convertir poco menos que en bancos. Alemany, en su línea, encantado de haberse conocido, esperando la jubilación y siempre a las órdenes de Fainé. Corre por ahí algún rumor de que podría ir de Conseller de Economía en un posible Govern de Artur Mas, pero lo veo más bien difícil. Ya veremos. Y el señor Lara es el que lo tiene más complicado. Está digiriendo la compra de Editis y lo lleva mal. Los bancos le tienen puesto el pie en el cuello y no le dejarán respirar hasta que rebaje el nivel de deuda a límites razonables. De los demás, poca cosa. Roures en concurso de acreedores y con muy malas cartas en su partida contra Prisa. Y los Gallardo, Carulla, y resto de la tropa a lo suyo. Es decir, que el negocio no se descontrole y a esperar a que soplen mejores vientos. De los ladrilleros, ni hablamos. Ya no existe casi ninguno. Es decir, calma chicha absoluta y cero espíritu emprendedor”.

En ese momento aparece una de las hijas del financiero y, sin decir nada ni mirar a nadie, se pasea elegantemente por la cubierta del fly en su camino hacia el jacuzzi de proa. La chica, recién cumplidos los veinte, está pasando la semana obligatoria de presencia en el barco de papá antes de volar de vuelta a Cerdeña para pasar el resto del verano con su último novio, que es lo que realmente le gusta. El abogado la mira fugazmente y, durante un breve segundo, recuerda a la madre de la criatura, una espectacular modelo alemana que compartió la vida de su cliente durante un par de años. Desde luego, la hija es un fiel reflejo de la madre.

- “¿Qué te parece la jugada de Apax con Panrico?”, pregunta de repente Doménico, sin levantar el tono de voz pero con una mirada directa, glacial, a los ojos del abogado. Éste, que ya lleva muchas horas de profesión en sus espaldas, se pone inmediatamente en alerta y, aunque ni un solo músculo de su cara se altera, sabe que la pregunta es cualquier cosa menos inocente. Su cerebro empieza a construir escenarios alternativos a toda velocidad intentando encajar las intenciones de su cliente, así que decide responder con prudencia hasta no tener más información.

- “Creo que a Nico Bonilla y a Oriol Pinya les van a hacer un monumento en Londres pero que la jugada que les han hecho a los bancos acreedores les va a cerrar el grifo de la financiación durante una buena temporada. Ellos han recuperado los 200 millones de euros que pusieron en la compra pero han entregado la empresa a los bancos a cambio de los 700 millones de deuda. El único problema es que para cobrar ellos primero vendieron los activos que tenían valor y lo que queda ahora vale mucho menos que esos 700 millones de euros. Los bancos tienen un lio muy serio con Panrico. Lo que sí tengo claro es que la familia Costafreda debe estar muriéndose de risa viendo el panorama y con los 900 millones en el bolsillo”.

El italiano, que hasta ahora estaba ligeramente recostado, se reincorpora sobre su butaca y, sonriendo ligeramente, acerca su cara a menos de dos palmos de la del abogado:

- “Muy bien. Pues te voy a contar lo que vamos a hacer con lo que queda de Panrico… (…)”.

El resto de la conversación es secreto profesional. A las tres de la tarde un bote auxiliar se separa del megayate azul y traslada al abogado de pantalón azul y polo blanco a su barco en el otro lado de la bahía. Mientras se aproxima y empieza a vislumbrar a su mujer y sus hijos en la cubierta, se dice a sí mismo: “Así que para esto me ha hecho venir. No me extraña que las empresas catalanas estén como están”.

Nada más saltar a cubierta y tras despedirse del marinero que le ha traído, su mujer le pregunta:

- “Cuanto has tardado, cariño… ¿Cómo ha ido?”.

- “Bien. Ha ido bien, preciosa. En este momento, nosotros somos un poco más ricos y Catalunya es un poco más pobre”.

Y el caluroso domingo por la tarde de julio sigue fluyendo en la bahía de S’Agaró a la espera de que dé comienzo la Final del Mundial entre España y Holanda…

(P.D.: Por supuesto, Doménico no se llama así en la realidad).

(c) FT.com

July 6 2010

Royal Bank of Scotland is preparing to sell up to £3bn ($5bn) of real estate loans made during the property boom in the largest property disposal from its non-core banking business to date.

The disposal is part of a five-year project by RBS under the leadership of Stephen Hester, chief executive, to shed large chunks of its business that the bank can no longer afford to hold.

RBS has been working with Lazard to create a structure to sell a vast portfolio of real estate debt, the first time that a large UK lender has brought such a substantial number of loans to the market since the property crash.

The loans are part of the £258bn division carved out of the core business 18 months ago and headed by Rory Cullinan, the former deputy chairman of private equity at Renaissance Partners.

The portfolio had been shrunk to £194bn by the end of March, but property assets which have been harder to reduce, now account for more than a quarter of the total.

The sale is one of a number of initiatives that RBS is working on to the reduce its loan book.

Further sales of loans are likely if this proves successful. Also under consideration is putting property loans into listed vehicles or packaging and securitising them.

Although the non-core division comprises a slew of corporate lending and legacy trading positions, it is the property portfolio that causes investors the greatest concerns.

“The viability of the whole non-core wind-down has a lot to do with how the commercial real estate market pans out,” said Simon Maughan, analyst at MF Global.

Those close to the talks say that the project is in the early stages and that formal marketing has not yet begun. RBS and Lazard declined to comment.

Several private equity groups are expected to show an interest in the loan portfolio, although its size means the number of bidders is likely to remain fairly low.

Those in the market for such large books of complicated loans include Blackstone, LoanStar and Delancey, the company run by Jamie Ritblat, son of property tycoon Sir John Ritblat.

The disposal will be significant for the real estate market given the huge amounts of outstanding debt to the sector, and the worries about the need for aggressive action by the banks.

(c) Servicio de Estudios La Caixa, Marzo de 2010

Conclusiones

Las señales de que lo peor va quedando atrás son claras, pero la salida de la recesión no va a ser un camino de rosas. Y éste es, precisamente, el reto que tienen ante sí los responsables de la política monetaria y que ha desencadenado el debate sobre las «estrategias de salida», es decir, cómo y cuándo retirar los estímulos –no sólo monetarios, sino también fiscales– que han servido para frenar la caída.

La actuación de algunos bancos centrales que expandieron de forma espectacular su balance para inyectar liquidez y recortaron los tipos de interés oficiales hasta mínimos ha evitado la deflación y ha sentado las bases de la recuperación. No obstante, de mantenerse esta situación a medio plazo, se correrían elevados riesgos inflacionistas.

Hay que retirar la liquidez excesiva y normalizar los tipos de interés, pero cuidando de que los sistemas bancarios puedan asumir el nuevo marco sin contratiempos, que no se deterioren las condiciones financieras del sector privado, todavía en pleno desapalancamiento, y que no se perturbe la financiación de la creciente deuda del sector público.

En este punto son del todo necesarios avances en la consolidación fiscal. Unos presupuestos públicos expansivos combinados con una política monetaria restrictiva complicarían la recuperación del sector privado.

Un dilema adicional se presenta en el ámbito de la eurozona, donde la aplicación de una única política monetaria en economías que se sitúan en momentos cíclicos distintos puede complicar la salida de la recesión.

Podría pensarse que la solución sería mantener la laxitud monetaria hasta que la actividad dé señales claras de mejora, pero el riesgo de perder el anclaje de las expectativas de inflación es demasiado elevado.

Además, no hay que olvidar que muchos consideran que la etapa de dinero barato que precedió a la crisis alimentó la burbuja de activos que la convirtió en letal.

Por todo ello, 2010 será un año complicado en el que el acierto en la aplicación de las estrategias de salida será clave en la recuperación del equilibrio de los mercados monetarios y en el logro de que el dinero y el crédito vuelvan a fluir de manera regular al conjunto de la economía.

Análisis General

  • Los datos del cuarto trimestre de 2009, conocidos en las últimas semanas, confirman la mejora de la actividad económica, la salida de la recesión en la mayor parte de economías desarrolladas y el buen ritmo de las emergentes.
  • La mejor evolución la presenta un selecto e importante grupo de países emergentes entre los que destacan Brasil y China.
  • Un segundo grupo de países, encabezados por Estados Unidos, están en vías de consolidar su recuperación.
  • Sin embargo, el recorrido al alza del crecimiento en USA sigue limitado por la elevada tasa de paro, el proceso de desapalancamiento de los hogares y el mercado de la vivienda Todo ello hará que la recuperación sea lenta y probablemente algo errática.
  • La economía japonesa creció un 4,6% intertrimestral anualizado en el cuarto trimestre. De todas formas, pese a la fuerza del repunte, la reacción nipona dista de ser vigorosa. El endeudamiento de las arcas públicas japonesas es el mayor de entre las economías ricas.

Análisis de la Eurozona

  • El grupo de países al que le está costando más dejar atrás la recesión está formado, fundamentalmente, por los integrantes de la Unión Europea (UE).
  • La Eurozona técnicamente, ya no está en recesión, pero el perfil de salida que se está dibujando es muy plano. Todo apunta a que tanto el consumo privado como la inversión se mantienen más rezagados de lo esperado, con lo que la recuperación sigue siendo altamente dependiente de la evolución del sector exterior.
  • Se mantiene la previsión de crecimiento para 2010 en el 1,2%, pero los riesgos a la baja están aumentando, especialmente el relativo a la retirada de la política fiscal expansiva, si se hace antes de lo previsto y de forma más rápida de lo deseado.
  • El tipo de interés de referencia se mantendrá en el nivel actual hasta el cuarto trimestre, pero si algunos países se ven obligados a retirar sus medidas fiscales expansivas antes de lo previsto, ello podría obligar al BCE a posponer el inicio de la subida de tipos hasta el año próximo.
  • La valoración de estos riesgos ha determinado la evolución de los mercados financieros a lo largo del último mes. El aumento de la incertidumbre impulsó un rápido incremento de la volatilidad y las primas de riesgo a nivel global.
  • La volatilidad más intensa se ha producido en los mercados de deuda pública. Las crecientes dudas sobre la situación fiscal de Grecia derivaron en un notable endurecimiento de las condiciones exigidas a sus bonos soberanos, lo que encendió la alarma sobre el riesgo de impago y generó un efecto contagio sobre la deuda de otros países con elevados desequilibrios públicos, como España.

Análisis Específico de España

  • En cuanto a la economía española, los datos correspondientes al cuarto trimestre de 2009 muestran una mejora de la coyuntura, si bien ésta no ha conseguido todavía el empuje suficiente como para presentar tasas positivas.
  • En cuanto a la economía española, los datos correspondientes al cuarto trimestre de 2009 muestran una mejora de la coyuntura, si bien ésta no ha conseguido todavía el empuje suficiente como para presentar tasas positivas.
  • El descenso trimestral del PIB fue del 0,1%. La tasa interanual pasó del –4,0% en el tercer trimestre al –3,1% del cuarto. El año 2009 cerró con un descenso del PIB del 3,6%, el peor resultado en más de medio siglo.
  • Las tasas positivas en la evolución del PIB se harán esperar hasta esta primera mitad de 2010. Cabe destacar el crecimiento del consumo privado en octubre-diciembre 2009 tras seis trimestres de retrocesos, y el estancamiento del trimestre anterior.
  • Las perspectivas, sin embargo, son de recuperación muy contenida del gasto de consumo, puesto que en 2010 se retirarán algunas medidas de impulso fiscal que han beneficiado el gasto familiar (subvenciones a la compra de vehículos, reducción de impuestos directos) y, además, a mediados de año se aplicará un aumento del impuesto sobre el valor añadido.
  • La evolución del empleo tampoco va a favorecer la situación económica de las familias, puesto que se espera que en 2010 se van a seguir perdiendo empleos, si bien a un ritmo muy inferior a los 1,2 millones del pasado año.
  • También es destacable el crecimiento, por segundo trimestre consecutivo, de la inversión en equipo. Con todo, la recuperación de la inversión total queda todavía algo lejos, debido principalmente al componente de construcción y, más en concreto, a la rama inmobiliaria, que a finales de 2009 presentaba un retroceso de casi el 25% en tasa interanual.
  • Otro elemento esperanzador de los datos de la contabilidad nacional del cuarto trimestre es la contribución positiva del sector exterior al crecimiento del PIB, que se produce por octavo trimestre consecutivo.
  • Las importaciones de bienes y servicios se desplomaron el 17,9% en el año pasado y bajaron más que las exportaciones. La constante mejora del desequilibrio exterior ha permitido reducir espectacularmente la necesidad de financiación de la economía, que en términos de PIB ha pasado del 9,1% del PIB en 2008 a casi la mitad en 2009, el 4,7%.
  • Finalmente, el cuadro macroeconómico del último trimestre de 2009 muestra una acusada desaceleración del consumo público con el objetivo de corregir el desequilibrio de las cuentas públicas en los próximos años con el fin de alcanzar un déficit del 3% del PIB en 2013, partiendo del 11,4% registrado en 2009.
© Gary Shilling
Published at John Mauldin’s Thoughts from the Frontline
frontlinethoughts.com

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Our investment strategies for 2010 follow from our forecast of continued economic weakness and deflation, as discussed earlier in this report and in previous Insights, especially our Dec. 2009 edition. We see the 2010 investment climate dominated by weak economic growth here and abroad, led by U.S. consumer retrenchment. More government fiscal stimulus and continuing Fed policy ease are likely in this setting. So is low inflation or deflation.

INVESTMENTS TO BUY

1. Buy Treasury Bonds. Long-term Insight readers know we started recommending long Treasury bonds back in 1981 when we forecast secular and huge declines in inflation and interest rates. So we declared back then that “we’re entering the bond rally of a lifetime.” The yield on 30-year Treasurys was 14.7% and our eventual target was 3%. Last year, yields blew through 3% to reach 2.6% at year’s end, so in our Jan. 2009 Insight we declared “mission accomplished” and removed Treasury bonds from our recommended list.

But then Treasurys sold off, pushing the yield on the 30-year bond to 4.7% at the end of 2009. So we’ve reactivated the strategy with our forecast of a return in yields to 3.0% or lower. Treasurys will continue to be a safe haven in a troubled world and benefit from deflation as well as their three sterling features. They are the best credits in the world. They are highly liquid. And they generally can’t be called by the Treasury, and calls limit price appreciation when interest rates fall.

A decline in yields from 4.7% at present to 3.0% may not sound like much, but the bond price would appreciate over 34%. If it occurs over two years, then two years’ worth of interest is collected, and the total return on the 30-year Treasury would be 44%. On a 30-year zero-coupon Treasury, which pays no interest but is issued at a discount, the total return would be about 64% — most attractive! Recall that in 2008 when 30-year Treasurys rallied from 4.5% to 2.7%, their total return for the year was 42%.

Treasury bonds way outperformed equities in the 1980s and 1990s in what was the longest and strongest stock bull market on record. The superiority of Treasurys has been even more so since then. Chart 1, our all-time favorite graph, shows the results from investing $100 in a 25-year zero-coupon Treasury bond at its yield high (and price low) in October 1981, and rolling it into another 25-year Treasury annually to maintain that 25year maturity. In November 2009, that $100 was worth $16,972 with a compound annual return of 20.1%. In contrast, $100 invested in the S&P 500 at its low in July 1982 was worth $2,099 in November for an 11.8% annual return including dividend reinvestment. So Treasurys outperformed stocks by 8.1 times!

Doubters

Many believe Treasury yields are headed up, not down. They think that all the bank reserves created by the Fed that have not generated bank loans will do so, flooding the economy with money and then create excess demand and inflation. They also think the continual heavy issuance of Treasurys to fund the nonstop federal deficits will push up yields. In contrast, we don’t foresee the rapid economic growth needed to induce chastened banks to lend and cautious creditworthy borrowers to borrow. And if we’re wrong, it will take at least several years to eat up global excess capacity during which the ever-inflation-wary Fed will no doubt remove the excess bank reserves, as Fed officials have already indicated.

We do expect large federal deficits for many years, in part because of pressure on government to create jobs and restrain unemployment in a slow growth economy. But those deficits will increasingly be funded by U.S. consumers as their saving spree continues. Although stock market bulls salivate over the prospect that increased saving will mean more equity purchases, we believe most of the money will continue to reduce the immense debt consumers have accumulated in recent decades.

Repaying debt will be attractive to many Americans in 2010 and beyond as they shun many investments after their huge losses in stocks throughout this decade and their shocking setbacks in real estate. A number will want to be less leveraged as slower economic growth makes employment less stable and unemployment more likely. Chastened lenders, pressed by regulators, will be pushing individuals to lower their leverage by repaying debt.

Another concern for Treasury bonds is that continued huge federal deficits and the required Treasury financing will erode confidence in these issues by Americans and foreigners, as noted earlier. This seems unlikely, especially before the end of this year. Also, as U.S. consumers save more and curb spending on domestic products and imports, the trade and current account deficits will continue to shrink. Earlier federal deficits were financed by foreigners as they recycled back to the U.S. the dollars gained from their trade and current account surpluses. The growing U.S. current account deficit measured the increasing gap between domestic saving and investment, or, in effect, and the need for foreigners to not only finance government deficits but also make up for declining U.S. consumer saving.

But now, the current account and trade deficits are shrinking, and further declines will accrue in future years if, as we forecast, exports grow faster than imports. So foreigners will have smaller American current account deficits to finance. At the same time, much more of federal deficits will be financed by rising U.S. consumer saving.

With 3-month treasury bills yielding 0.046%, we’ve moved out on the yield curve for what is essentially cash positions in some cases. Sure, 5-year obligations are much more volatile than 3-month bills and do have risk of loss if interest rates rise. But we think the direction is down in that part of the interest rate curve, and 2.6% returns vs. 0.046% seem enough to offset the risks.

2. Buy Income-Producing Securities. This includes high-quality corporate and municipal bonds as well as stocks of utilities, consumer product companies, health care firms and others that pay meaningful dividends that are likely to rise. Master Limited Partnerships are also possibilities, but only if their underlying businesses are secure enough to continue significant income flows to limited partners and stockholders. Banks used to pay significant dividends but slashed them when their earnings collapsed. Nevertheless, their deleveraging and reversion to safer but less growth-oriented businesses will probably pressure them to again pay attractive dividends.

Utilities lagged behind the stock market last year, but at the end of November, the dividend yield on utilities averaged 4.5% compared to 2% for the S&P 500 index. That low return compares with 3%, which used to be the floor (Chart 2). Payout ratios recently have been essentially meaningless with the collapse in corporate earnings, but low, 31% in the third quarter of 2009. Under pressure from stockholders, dividend yields are likely to return to 3% or more. The current high level of corporate cash will also encourage dividend paying.. Also, the S&P utility sector has returned 53%, including dividends, since 2000 while the total return on the S&P 500 index has been a minus 11%.

With stocks likely to be weak this year, dividend yields may constitute 100% or more of total returns. Note, however, that although the prices of utility and other defensive stocks sometimes rise in bear markets associated with recessions, that’s not always the case. That was clearly true in 2008 when virtually every stock sector went down. Utility and other dividend-paying stocks and ETFs based on them, however, can be hedged against general stock market declines.

3. Buy Consumer Staples and Foods. Items like laundry detergent, bread and toothpaste are basic essentials of life that are purchased in good times and bad. In fact, as we’ve seen lately, consumers are buying more of their calories in supermarkets and they economize by eating at home rather than in restaurants. Note, however, that they are downgrading from national brands to cheaper house brands, and likely will continue to do so as a weak economy and high unemployment persist. Among retailers, the winners may continue to be discounters. Producers of national brands will need to continue to adapt to consumer downgrading by emphasizing cheaper “value” products.

4. Buy Small Luxuries. This is an investment concept we developed years ago. Consumers, especially when they’re hard pressed, tend to buy the very best of what they can afford, even if it’s within a low-priced category. We first noticed this tendency years ago, before apartheid ended in South Africa. We read that urban blacks there often carried the elegant, slim and expensive umbrellas typical of investment bankers in London. They couldn’t afford cars or maybe even taxi fares, but did achieve status and satisfaction with fine umbrellas. We also learned of a currently unemployed man who enjoyed the status of morning coffee at 7-Eleven six days a week. By reusing his cup and the one he takes home to his wife, he gets a 32-cent discount per $1.37 serving and saves $655 a year on this small luxury.

Companies are adapting to small luxury modes in various ways. Some are offering the same products with lower cost and selling prices. Coach is cutting ladies handbag prices and working with suppliers to reduce costs. Neiman Marcus is pressing suppliers for lower-cost versions of designer styles.

Others are putting their prestigious names on different products. C.F. Martin reintroduced its stripped down 1930s guitar for under $1,000. Average prices were in the $2,000 to $3,000 range and its top of the line guitar sells for $100,000. California winemakers are emphasizing cheaper wines as sales of those over $25 per bottle slump. Consumers are retrenching and dining out less at upscale restaurants where fine wines are sold. Tiffany sales of products over $50,000 are weak, but high-quality small items continue to sell well–always in its trademark blue box. Procter & Gamble has not cut prices on its top of the line products that sell at premiums but carry high-quality images. Consumers still splurge on such small luxuries as Gillette’s five-blade Fusion razor and Olay’s Pro-X moisturizer. But P&G has introduced cheaper “value” versions of Tide and other products to compete with the growing consumer interest in lower-cost national and house brands.

5. Buy The Dollar. Dumping on the dollar was the favorite sport of investors and the financial media until very recently. The financial meltdown in 2008 drove investors to the dollar as the global safe haven, but in early 2009 that status faded as fears of financial collapse melted. Buck-busters cited the record low short-term interest rates, with the fed funds target rate at 0-0.25%, even lower than in Japan. This made the greenback the preferred funding currency for the carry trade in which it is borrowed and then sold for other higher yielding currencies with rising interest rates. The falling dollar against those currencies enhances the profitability of those trades. Buck dumpers also emphasized the tremendous amount of dollars being pumped out by the Fed and the Treasury 70 in their attempt to revitalize the economy 68 and the Fed’s clearly-stated commitment to keep short-term interest rates low for an extended period.

Despite all its drawbacks, however, the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency and safe haven, regardless of suggestions by the Chinese and others that the dollar should eventually be replaced by a global currency. This status for the buck appears to be reemerging and will grow if we’re right and hopes for a rapid economic recovery are dashed. Furthermore, almost everyone was on the dump-the-dollar side of the boat, a situation similar to early in 2008 that preceded the dollar’s jump starting in mid-year (Chart 3). History suggests that when that happens, the winds often shift and all those folks will get tossed into the water as the boat sails in the reverse direction.

We favor selling British sterling since the U.K. economy remains in deep trouble, with even higher external debt than in the U.S.– a ratio to GDP of 404% in 2008 compared to 95% in this country, which has caused bond rating agencies to threaten a downgrade of U.K. government debt. Also, the troubled British financial sector accounts for 21% of total jobs compared with 14% in the U.S. The U.K. was almost alone among advanced countries in suffering a falling economy in the third quarter of last year.

The euro is vulnerable, in our view, because the eurozone has a one-size-fits-all monetary policy but its economies vary in strength from Germany and the Low Countries at the top to Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland at the bottom. Those lands can’t use independent monetary policies to stimulate their economies since that’s the providence of the European Central Bank. So they need to resort to fiscal stimuli and increasing government borrowing to finance the resulting deficits. A number have suffered sovereign debt rating downgrades, which increase their borrowing costs, and more are likely. This could spark renewed threats that one or more countries will withdraw from the eurozone and go back to using drachmas, draculas or whatever as their currencies. That probably won’t happen as the ECB will do all it can to prevent dissolution, but serious discussion of the likelihood could depress the euro considerably against the dollar.

These concerns are not new for us. Just as the euro was being launched 10 years ago, we wrote in our Dec. 1998 Insight that with a common currency, individual countries would be forced to rely on fiscal policy to deal with local business conditions and “the limit on fiscal stimulus will be default risks. Government bond investors and rating agencies will become the policemen and will blow the whistle…. It’s even possible that economic differentials among countries may be so great that the common currency doesn’t hold together, especially in the next European recession when unemployment leaps….”

Commodity-driven currencies like the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand dollars are also likely to weaken against the greenback as commodity prices fall. The Japanese economy remains weak and back in deflation, but the yen’s involvement I the carry trade makes it a tricky currency for investment.

6. Buy Eurodollar Futures. In most markets, traders want to be where the action is, where liquidity is the greatest even though that’s where competition is the strongest. Years ago, a jeweler in New York City complained to us about how fierce the competition was in his location. His shop was on 47th Street between Fifth and Sixth Avenues, the heart of the jewelry district. We asked why he didn’t move to a less competitive area. He shrugged and said, “This is where the action is.” In the case of short-term credit instruments used in futures trading, eurodollars are where the action is.

Our interest is in eurodollar futures contracts. Eurodollar futures are a way for companies and banks to lock in an interest rate today, for money it intends to borrow or lend in the future, and for investors to bet on the future direction of short-term interest rates. Each Eurodollar futures contract has a notional or “face value” of $1 million, though the leverage used in futures allows one contract to be traded with a margin of about $1,000. Trading in Eurodollar futures is extensive, and the market for them tends to be very liquid. The prices of Eurodollars are quite responsive to Fed policy, inflation, and economic indicators. It’s ironic that eurodollar futures markets dominate trading, not those for Treasury bills or federal funds on which eurodollars are essentially based.

Eurodollar futures prices are determined by the market’s forecast of the 3-month US$ LIBOR interest rate expected to prevail on the settlement date. Eurodollar futures contracts extend out for 40 quarters or 10 years, so they can be used to bet on interest rate movements many quarters ahead.

Long positions in eurodollar futures have been one of our most successful investments in recent years. Earlier, the futures market did not price in the full extent of the Fed-engineered decline in short-term interest rates. With our forecast of the financial crisis and the worst recession since the 1930s, however, we believed that the Fed would ease dramatically. So we reasoned that eurodollar futures prices would rise as they reflected the Fed’s action. So far, they have.

Now the futures market assumes that the Fed will raise its target rate in the course of this year, so the LIBOR rate on which eurodollar futures settle will increase by 1.22 percentage points between January and December. We, however, believe that a weak economy will keep the Fed on hold throughout this year, so the interest rate implied by the December 2010 contract will fall by 1.22 percentage points. That would result in a $3,050 profit on a $1 million futures contract. That’s a mere 0.3% gain. This is hardly worth the investment without leverage. But with only a $1,000 margin requirement on the futures contract, well, you do the math.

INVESTMENTS TO SELL OR AVOID

We hope these six investment strategies for 2010 that involve buying or being long securities are useful. But given our forecast that, at best, the U.S. and global economies will be sluggish this year, it won’t be a surprise that we have a longer list of strategies that involve selling or avoiding various sectors. In fact, there are 11, or nearly twice as many.

7. Sell U.S. Stocks in General. The S&P 500 index in late December was selling at 19 times top-down Wall Street strategists’ operating earnings estimate of $60.59 per share for this year, as noted earlier. That’s an historically high P/E to start with that makes stocks vulnerable going into the year. Even more so because it assumes a steep economic recovery in 2010. And even more so if our forecast of continuing recession or sluggish recovery at best proves out. Our $50 estimate of operating earnings, down 11% from estimates for 2009, puts the S&P 500 index P/E at a nosebleed 22.5 level, as noted earlier.

Selling stock indices short, either through futures contracts or ETFs, strikes us as a prudent idea. Index shorts can also hedge long positions in utilities or other long strategies we discussed earlier.

Be well aware that our forecast of a declining U.S. stock market is critical to many other strategies we’ll discuss later that involve selling or avoiding equity sectors here and abroad. We believe they all will perform worse than the stock market overall, but if we’re wrong and the stock market leaps this year, we’ll probably also be wrong on many of these other strategies.

8. Sell Homebuilder and Selected Related Stocks. Homebuilder stocks rebounded sharply from their March 2009 lows, along with stocks in general, but peaked in September with a slight downward trend since then. This may be beginning to reflect our forecast of another 10% decline in house prices (Chart 4). Excess inventories of houses for sale, the mortal enemy of prices, remain huge. And inventories may rise, even with housing starts at very low levels, as people foreclosed out of their houses double up with family and friends.

Also, a quarter of homeowners with mortgages are under water, 40% of those who took out mortgages in 2006. Increasing numbers of these people are convinced that they’ll never regain positive home equity and are abandoning their abodes in favor of renting other houses at lower monthly costs. Still, the subsequent foreclosures on their mortgages will keep them from qualifying for a government-guaranteed mortgage for three to five years and will stay on their credit records for seven years.

Despite leaping mortgage delinquencies, federally-mandated but mostly unsuccessful mortgage modification programs are keeping many houses, especially middle- and higher-priced homes, from being foreclosed and sold–temporarily. Furthermore, the investment tax credit for new and some existing home buyers, which was extended beyond November 2009, is scheduled to expire in April. The overhang of aging new single-family homes available for sale is huge (Chart 5 ). Also note that new residential mortgages are almost entirely dependent on guarantees from government entities such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHA, and they are tightening their credit standards.

Low mortgage rates are a plus, but are only meaningful to those who qualify for loans as lending standards tighten. Most now need to meet the old conservative standards of 20% down, good credit, full documentation of income and assets, etc. And lower borrowing rates don’t help underwater homeowners either refinance or buy other houses. Furthermore, rates on large “jumbo” mortgages remain high. Finally, lower house prices don’t induce buyers who expect the downward trend to continue and hold out for even-lower prices.

9. Sell Selected Big-Ticket Consumer Discretionary Equities–for two powerful reasons. First, as consumers persist in their saving spree they’ll continue to curtail spending on expensive postponeable items. Second, as widespread price declines persist, they will be anticipated. Prospective buyers will wait for lower prices. As a result, excess inventories and unused capacity will mount, forcing prices lower. That will confirm prospective buyers’ suspicions so they’ll wait for still-lower prices in a self-feeding downward spiral.

Deflationary expectations are clearly at work in the vehicle market. The cash-for-clunkers program generated one-time sales as buyers viewed it as just one more rebate inducement in a never-ending stream. But who would dare announce to a friend that he paid the full sticker price for any car? Of course, deflationary expectations don’t work for small, inexpensive items. Suppose you know for sure that toothpaste will be cheaper next month. If you run out, you won’t brush your teeth with Ajax while waiting for lower prices before buying a tube.

Even the rich, normally immune to recessions, are cutting back and downgrading. Note the weak sales at Tiffanys, Nordstrom and Saks Fifth Avenue and the poor auction results for Sotheby’s and Christie’s. A Merrill Lynch study found that the number of people in the world with $1 million or more in investable assets fell from 10.1 million in 2007 to 8.6 million in 2008. Those assets dropped from $40.7 trillion to $32.8 trillion. Their equity holdings fell in step with the S&P 500, about 40%, and their real estate also dropped in value.

Ever since the data series began in 1967, the share of income of the top 20% has trended up while all other shares fell. Note that these are shares, not income levels–which have grown on balance for all quintiles. Studies have found considerable rotation in and out of the various quintiles, with many of those in the top bracket in a given year absent from it in earlier and later years. Still, the drop in purchasing power for many middle-income people in the last year in addition to the collapse in their homes’ values has created considerable anger at those at the top.

The equities of most producers of big-ticket consumer discretionary goods and services collapsed in the 2007-2009 bear market, reflecting consumers’ buying strike, but have recovered somewhat since March. With our conviction that American consumers have reached a watershed and switched from a quarter century borrowing-and-spending binge to a decade or longer saving spree, we are very suspicious of the sustainability of any rebound in stocks of producers of major consumer discretionary products such as cruise lines and airlines.

10. Sell Banks and Other Financial Institutions. During the financial free-for-all days, large banks moved well beyond traditional spread lending–taking deposits and then lending them with interest rate spreads to cover their costs, loan risks and reasonable profits. They hyped their leverage–and their risk–as they set up off-balance sheet vehicles, engaged in proprietary trading and in the origination of and investment in derivatives. Regulators stood by under the theory that free markets would discipline excessive risk-taking. Both the big banks and the regulators, however, knew or should have known that those institutions were too big to fail and could take the financial system down with them. So those financial institutions were really playing a game of, heads we win, tails we get bailed out.

And fail they did, and bailed out they have been. Many investors seem to believe that’s the end of the unpleasantness and now it’s back to business as usual. The recent big trading profits by some financial institutions certainly point in that direction as did the stock rebounds until recently. We doubt it, though. The financial sector expanded its leverage over about three decades and its deleveraging will probably consume most or all of the next decade. Big risk-taking CEOs like Ken Lewis at Bank of America are being forced out, sending a clear message to the senior officers who remain.

Stringent, probably excessive regulation is replacing the laissez faire model. Higher capital requirements and other limits on risk-taking will curb bank profitability. So will the limits on executive pay aimed at reducing the incentive to take big risks.

Weak Loan Demand

Furthermore, with slow economic growth, consumer zeal to save and repay debts, and weak capital spending this year, loan demand will likely be weak. In addition, the present steep yield curve makes borrowing cheap deposits and lending long-term at higher interest rates very profitable. But it will probably flatten as the year progresses and long rates fall. Banks, of course, can increase fees on checking and other accounts, but are limited by competition from money market funds and other alternatives.

Also, banks’ costs of borrowing in the bond market is well off its highs relative to Treasurys, but still elevated compared to pre-crisis years. The spread now runs over three percentage points compared to about one in pre-crisis days. Much of the cheap debt banks acquired from private markets in earlier years and the government more recently will mature in the next several years and need to be replaced at much higher costs. The maturities for U.S. banks have dropped from 7.8 to 3.2 years in the past five years.

Regional and community banks are also likely to be unattractive investments this year. Ironically, in the go-go days, many of them were unwilling to virtually abandon their underwriting standards to compete with nonblank residential mortgage lenders. So they lent to the commercial real estate market instead. That’s proving to be a jump from the frying pan into the fire, as discussed earlier, and is shown by weak demand, falling prices and rising delinquencies. Regional banks have more than their share of the $1.7 trillion in outstanding commercial real estate owned by all banks. These loans constitute 35% of regional banks; total loans, up from 25% in 2000.

Due to bad commercial as well as residential real estate loans, smaller banks are dropping like flies, 140 so far this year (Chart 6 ). Individually, they aren’t too big to fail, but collectively they are since they are the primary financers of smaller businesses. Those businesses don’t have access to commercial paper and other credit market vehicles and must rely on their local banks for loans–or on the personal credit cards of their owners.

11. Sell Consumer Lenders’ Stocks. Consumer lenders’ stocks have also rebounded sharply from their March 2009 lows. We were wrong on our strategy of selling them last year, but believe it will work in 2010.

Consumer lenders had their hey day during the long consumer borrowing-and-spending spree. Consumers were trained–and we use that word deliberately–to believe they deserved instant material gratification. Buy now, put it on the plastic card and pay later– much later–became the norm. And creditworthiness was no problem for credit card issuers and other consumer lenders. They sliced and diced consumers’ financial statuses, used sophisticated models to determine payment risks and charged fees and interest rates to fit any risk category.

But their models and analyses inherently assumed that the borrowing-and-spending binge, as well as the ability to repay, would last indefinitely. But then consumers suddenly switched to a saving spree and started to pay down credit card and other debts. Also, heavy layoffs, leaping unemployment and collapsing house prices and inadequate consumer incomes spiked credit card delinquencies. Congress last year restricted credit card fees and interest charges. Also, consumers went on a buyers strike a year ago and cut back on their use of credit, debit and charge cards.

Recent developments are virtually all negative for the credit card business now and for years to come. The cottage industry to help these people deal with their huge credit card debts is exploding in size. As noted earlier, charge cards and debit cards are replacing credit cards as consumers realize they can’t trust themselves to restrain debt and need to pay off monthly or accumulate the money in a bank account before spending it. Layaway plans are replacing the buy now-pay later approach. With the switch from a quarter century consumer borrowing-and-spending binge to a long run saving spree, the credit card business has moved from a growth industry to a laggard.

12. Sell Many Low and Old Tech Capital Equipment Producers. Low and old tech producers will remain depressed in a world of chronic excess capacity. When operating rates are low, producers don’t need more capacity and worry that revenues, prices and profits won’t be adequate to justify even existing capacity. And note that the volatility of the producers of equipment is much greater than that of the users. Auto sales declined by over 47% from their peak in July 2005, but orders for machine tools, automatic transfer lines and other equipment fell much more as auto assemblers and parts makers almost froze orders. Recall as well how the recession-sired excess capacity in airlines has caused massive cancellations and postponements of orders for Boeing’s Dreamliner.

Earlier, we discussed our statistical models that explained capital spending. They show that in accounting for the year-over-year change in the equipment and software or in equipment and software plus nonresidential structures components of GDP, thelevel of operating rates is far and away the most important explanatory variable, even more so for the year-over-year change in operating rates. This indicates that even if capacity utilization is growing rapidly, if it remains at low levels as at present, the growth in capital spending will be subdued.

Other variables, such as the year-over-year changes in cash flow, profits and interest costs, were statistically significant in our models, but much less effective in explaining the change in capital spending. These findings are important because many believe that the negative gap between capital expenditures and internal funds is sure to generate a capital spending surge. But our models, based on history, say that with huge excess capacity, that cash flow won’t burn holes in corporate pockets. And our models don’t quantify and add in the extra corporate caution spawned by today’s recessionary climate and financial crises.

Besides the depressing effects of excess capacity, low and old tech companies suffer from ongoing problems. Foreign competition continues to grow as their technology is transferred to China and other cheap production locales. Some suffer rising cost pressures due to lack of productivity gains. High-cost unionized labor forces are sometimes a problem. And many sell into saturated, slow growth markets.

13. If You Plan to Sell Your House, Second Home or Investment Houses Any Time Soon, Do So Yesterday. This strategy has worked for the last two years and will continue to do so if we’re correct and house prices nationwide fall another 10%. Sure, prices have been weakest in states like Florida, Arizona, Nevada and California where the biggest bubbles preceded the collapses. But almost every area of the country has experienced price declines (Chart 7).

Many owners have tried to wait out the bear market in housing, a technique that worked in earlier years when any price declines were small and short-lived. But huge excess inventories, a flood of distressed sales after mortgage modification attempts are over, depressed incomes and rising unemployment will probably keep sellers plentiful, buyers reluctant and prices falling throughout 2010 and perhaps beyond. In past regional house price collapses, it’s taken homeowners a year-and-a-half to give up and throw their houses on the market for whatever they will bring. After the final bottom is reached, house prices will likely mirror inflation, or in future years, deflation as they have historically.

14. Sell Junk Bonds. During the dark days of the financial crisis, the yields on junk bonds leaped to 19.3 percentage points over Treasurys as investors worried about complete financial collapse and widespread defaults among low-grade issues. Triple-C rated bonds, the lowest junk tier, sold at 42.6 cents on the dollar at the beginning of last year.

But the bailout of the big banks and easing of the financial crisis allayed investor fears and junk spreads narrowed. Institutional investors piled in, followed by individual investors, many of whom sought alternatives to low returns on bank deposits and money market funds. So the spread has dropped to 4.6 percentage points, much closer to where it was before the crisis began. Last year, junk bonds returned over 50%, much more than the 25% gain on the S&P 500 index.

Nevertheless, we believe this rally is way overdone. Default rates on junk bonds normally peak late in recessions or in the year after it ends. Also, the default rate may reach or exceed the previous peak in 2002 if the economy remains weak, suggesting major declines in junk bond prices. Furthermore, the value of bonds after default is likely to go lower if the recession drags on, as we forecast. Slow revenue and cash flow growth will make it difficult if not impossible for a number of financially weak and weakening firms to service their bonds and other debts.

15. Sell Commercial Real Estate. As discussed earlier, excess capacity and big refinancing requirements in coming years will continue to plague hotels, malls, warehouses and office buildings. Moody’s/REAL Commercial Property Price Index was down 44% last October from its October 2007 peak. Retailers closed 8,300 stores last year, more than the previous peak of 6,900 in 2001. Businesses will continue to cut costs this year, not only by holding down employment and therefore the need for office space, but also by moving in the partitions to fit the remaining people in less space, as mentioned earlier.

Increasing use of telecommuting will also reduce need for office buildings. And more teleconferencing will cut hotel-utilizing business trips, especially after intensified airport security in reaction to the recent terrorist incident in Detroit on Christmas Day. At the same time, frugal consumers will restrain discretionary travel and the hotel and motel use involved. Weak consumer spending will keep mall and warehouse space under pressure.

Some believe that commercial real estate woes may exceed the residential collapse, and they may be right. Commercial tends to be less leveraged but if refinancing isn’t available, it may note make much difference how leveraged it is. Also, distressed commercial real estate owners definitely don’t have the political sympathy and bailout prospects enjoyed by troubled homeowners. The Fed has set high standards for bailout loans on commercial real estate. Commercial real estate REITs rebounded last year along with the overall stock market (Chart 8 ), but strike us as vulnerable. These leaps combined with plummeting real estate prices have pushed REIT prices to a 25% premium over their net asset values.

16. Sell Most Commodities. Commodity prices rebounded last year and benefited from cheap and available money. Some live in their own worlds. Petroleum is not only influenced by fundamental supply-demand conditions, but also by OPEC decisions. Natural gas prices in the U.S. weakened last year with the recession, but also because of new production technology that unlocked abundant shale gas. The prices of agriculture commodities, including honey, are highly dependent on weather.

In any event, we believe that economic supply and demand will rule most industrial commodity prices this year and result in weakness due to sluggish global business conditions. Also, investors put a record $50 billion into commodities in 2008 but then retreated last year after prices nosedived. They learned the hard way that commodities aren’t an asset class but speculations, and may be cautious this year. And the strengthening dollar should depress the prices of the many commodities traded worldwide in dollar terms. We look for falling commodity prices this year. Also, we believe that many commodity-producing companies and their suppliers of equipment and supplies will be unattractive investments as weak demand, excess capacity and soft prices persist. The same is true for economies such as Persian Gulf sheikdoms that depend heavily on petroleum, as witnessed by the financial collapse of Dubai.

17. Sell Developing Country Stocks and Bonds. As late as the end of 2007, most forecasters believed in decoupling. Even if the U.S. economy suffers a setback, they said, the rest of the world, especially developing countries like China and India, would continue to flourish. Indeed, the strength of those economies could even aid the U.S. as they bought more American exports.

We disagreed. We did a study two years ago that found that China was not yet developed sufficiently to have enough people with discretionary spending to support the economy domestically. She remained export-led, with most of those exports going directly or indirectly to U.S. consumers. So, with our forecast of a major retrenchment by U.S. consumers, we predicted big trouble for China. Our analysis revealed that in China, it takes about $5,000 per capita to have meaningful discretionary spending power. About 110 million Chinese had that much or more, but they constituted only 8% of the population. In India, that class was a mere 5% of the population. In contrast, it takes $26,000 per capita in the U.S. to have discretionary spending power and 80% of Americans have at least that much.

Well, as they say, the rest is history. The Chinese and most other developing Asian countries nosedived as U.S. consumers retrenched. But in the wake of China’s huge $585 billion stimulus program last year, massive imports of industrial materials like iron ore and copper, jumps in construction of cement, steel and power plants and other industrial capacity, and a pick up in economic growth, many forecasters again believe in decoupling.

We continue to disagree. Sure, some countries such as Brazil were not hurt too severely by the global recession, at least so far. Still, most developing economies depend on exports for growth, and the U.S. consumer has been the biggest buyer of those exports and far and away the globe’s biggest spenders. As the American consumer saving spree continues to shrink the U.S. trade and current account deficits (Chart 9), those developing economies will be subdued.

China’s economy looks like a house of cards. Her most recent fiscal stimulus not only went into industrial capacity-building but also bank lending-spawned stock market and real estate speculation. But what will utilize that capacity and justify those speculations? The usual outlet, exports, is curtailed by retrenching U.S. consumers. And, as noted, China is not far enough down the road to industrialization for local consumers to fill the gap.

We doubt that the rebounds in emerging market stocks and bonds correctly forecast robust, decoupled economic growth that is sustainable. While the S&P 500 now trades at 20 times earnings over the last 12 months, normally cheaper emerging markets are more expensive. Recently, the Shanghai Composite Index sported a 32 P/E while South Korea’s was at 35 and Indonesia’s was at 29. And note that the 65% jump in emerging market stocks in 2009 only offset two-thirds of the 54% drop in 2008.

Furthermore, as was made clear by the universal weakness in security markets in 2008, bond and stock markets around the world are highly correlated. With globalization, the days are gone when a globe-trotting sleuth can discover gems in the remote reaches of Asia or Latin America. The similarity of bond and stock performance is even greater when adjusted for risk. Emerging market stocks and bonds may climb more in bull markets, but have greater falls when the bear arrives, as we believe he is about to. There’s no such thing as free lunch.

(c) Expansión.com, 16-01-10

El precio de la vivienda cerró 2009 con una caída del 6,2%, según los datos oficiales ofrecidos por el Ministerio de Vivienda. Eso supondría una ralentización en el ritmo de descenso, del 7,8%, a finales de septiembre.

Ya entonces el Ministerio dio por finalizada la supuesta fase de desplome de los precios, y la aparente moderación de ahora probablemente contribuirá a abonar los argumentos de los que, como algunas entidades financieras y el propio sector inmobiliario, sostienen que los precios no tienen mucho más margen de recorte, en un intento de espolear a los potenciales compradores para que no esperen gangas más adelante.

El grupo de las grandes inmobiliarias, el denominado G-14, advertía esta misma semana por boca de su presidente, Pedro Pérez, que el ajuste llevado a cabo “ya es suficiente” y que existe el riesgo de un “sobreajuste” con graves consecuencias para el empleo. La cuestión es en qué medida la realidad del mercado se compadece con ese diagnóstico. Si las estadísticas siempre deben tomarse con mucha cautela, en el sector inmobiliario aún más, pues tradicionalmente no gozan de mucha fiabilidad.

La percepción generalizada es que la corrección real de precios, que los expertos cifran en torno a un 10%, sería aún insuficiente si se considera la burbuja que sobrevaloró los inmuebles en más de un 30%. Sería preciso, por tanto, un recorte adicional de otros veinte puntos porcentuales para engrasar el mercado.

Este argumento viene reforzado por la colosal sobreoferta –se estima que el stock de viviendas nuevas supera el millón y sigue creciendo– que tardará tiempo en absorberse y porque la mejora del esfuerzo familiar –la relación entre cuota hipotecaria y renta– no ha sido tan intensa como en otros países donde sí se aprecia una reactivación inmobiliaria. Este es el caso de EEUU, donde se ha producido un drástico ajuste en precios que empieza a desembocar en una mayor dinamismo del sector.

Pérez insiste en que el Gobierno establezca nuevos incentivos y ayudas para activar el mercado inmobiliario, so pena de que se puedan perder este año 200.000 empleos en el sector. Pero no parece que gastar más dinero público en ayudas a sectores, en este caso el inmobiliario, sea la solución más acertada.

El mejor estímulo para animar el mercado inmobiliario, y el consumo en general, reside sin duda en la reactivación del mercado laboral, y eso lamentablemente no se encuentra en un horizonte próximo. Mientras tanto, por más que el sector se resista a una indefectible realidad, el mejor estímulo para animar a los compradores es que se produzca el necesario ajuste en los precios.

America’s enlightened treatment of bankrupt firms remains a model to the world

Jan 7th 2010
© The Economist
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The American model has seldom looked so tarnished. America’s unemployment rate is 10%. Soup kitchens are doing a flourishing business in New York and other great cities. Companies that were once a byword for swashbuckling entrepreneurialism have bitten the dust.

But in one respect at least America remains a beacon for the rest of the world: its treatment of corporate bankruptcy. This may sound cockeyed. America’s excessive appetite for risk helped plunge the world into recession (though over-leveraged European banks also did their bit). And America’s consumers are defaulting on their debts at astronomical rates—and expecting the rest of society to pick up the bills for their profligacy. But countries that want to avoid unnecessary corporate carnage would nevertheless be foolish to ignore the American example.

America’s enlightened attitude to corporate bankruptcy is designed to put economic resources back to productive use as quickly as possible. This means distinguishing between potentially viable companies and terminally ill ones. The potentially viable can file for “Chapter 11”, which lets them restructure under court supervision. The terminally ill can file for “Chapter 7”, which focuses on liquidating their assets and distributing them among creditors. It also means putting pressure on the courts to deal with bankruptcy as quickly as possible. Chrysler and General Motors were both in the hands of “new owners” within 45 days of filing for bankruptcy. It also means treating bankrupts relatively leniently, not as sinners to be flagellated but rather as unfortunates who should be given a second chance.

America’s generosity to capitalism’s losers has served it remarkably well. It has not only prevented giant companies such as United Airlines and General Motors from going into premature liquidation, throwing thousands of people out of work. It has also helped provide America with its entrepreneurial edge. Bankruptcy is an occupational hazard for entrepreneurs; even those with plenty of business experience under their belts fail much more often than they succeed. America’s leniency towards bankrupts encourages novices to start their own businesses and allows people who have failed to start again.

The good news is that a growing number of countries are following America’s lead. Britain has introduced a succession of Enterprise Acts since 2002 that are designed to make it easier for failed entrepreneurs to start new businesses. In 2007 China adopted a new bankruptcy law—its first since 1949 and 11 years in the making—that makes it easier to restructure insolvent firms.

The credit crunch has speeded up the pace of reform. The World Bank’s annual “Doing Business” report provides a wealth of examples of improvements. Many governments are trying to shake up their lethargic legal systems in order to speed up bankruptcy proceedings. The reforms also touch upon the more fundamental question of trying to save viable businesses from premature liquidation. Dozens of countries are trying to give companies more opportunities to reorganise before they finally reach for the revolver. France and Germany were among the first to do this. But the idea has also spread to eastern Europe and Asia and may even be reaching the bankruptcy-averse Muslim world (last year ten Middle Eastern and north African countries signed a joint declaration on planned reforms).

Moving towards a more enlightened treatment of bankruptcy will not be easy, particularly for poor countries with inefficient legal systems and retributive attitudes to debt. The World Bank reports that the majority of reforms have taken place in rich countries: since 2004 59% of them have improved their systems compared with 33% of poorer countries in East Asia, 22% in Latin America, 16% in the Middle East and 13% in South Asia. And poorer countries have an enormous distance to travel. In rich countries, bankruptcy proceedings take less than two years on average. In South Asia they take an average of four-and-a-half years. In many countries—Turkey is a notorious example—legal fees can eat up almost all the value of a business.

It beats flagellation

Attitudes to debt are also difficult to change. America threw off the old world’s hostility to failed businessmen along with British rule. Back in the 1830s one of the things that most struck Alexis de Tocqueville about the country was “the strange indulgence which is shown to bankrupts”, which, he said, diverged “not only from the nations of Europe, but from all the commercial nations of our time.” The generous provisions of Chapter 11 only reinforced a longstanding legal prejudice. In 1934, for example, the Supreme Court declared that bankruptcy laws ought to “give the honest but unfortunate debtor…a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”

True, giving a clear field to the honest but unfortunate also opens the way to all sorts of chancers. America’s generous treatment of corporate bankrupts has been widely abused by common spendthrifts—so much so that Congress tightened the law in 2005 to restrict access to the system. Britain’s attempt to emulate the American example has also led to an epidemic of freeloading. In 2006 only about a quarter of the people who filed for bankruptcy could remotely be described as entrepreneurs.

That is irritating, but governments should nevertheless continue to rehabilitate bankruptcy. Making it easier to close a business may not sound as inviting as announcing yet another “enterprise fund” or “innovation initiative”, but it is more vital to reviving the world’s moribund economy. In the short term enlightened bankruptcy laws reduce unemployment by keeping viable companies alive. In the longer term they boost rates of entrepreneurship. The best way to get more people to start businesses is to make it easier to wind them up.

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